Treaty between the Basters and Germans was concluded. Although this treaty, to a great extent, confirmed the previously acquired freedom and rights of the Basters, the independent executive powers of the captain and Baster Council, especially with regard to "foreign policy", were significantly curtailed. In due course the Rehoboth Basters were increasingly involved in the German effort to subject the indigenous inhabitants. After the signing of the military treaty of 26 July 1895, the Basters were trained as soldiers and conscripted to do military service.
Although the Rehoboth Basters undoubtedly enjoyed more privileges than the other local population groups during the German administration period, other aspects of their privileged position were also gradually curtailed. This was done, despite the 1885 agreement and continuous loyalty such as was, among others, proven in practice by the rendering of valuable military assistance. In this regard it was especially taxability, the gradual implementation of German laws, the abolition of the position of the captain and the impairment of the independent executive powers of
The word Gebiet-(territory) dates from the German government's rule and was retained during the South African administration.
the Baster Council, that caused dissatisfaction.
In addition, the management of boundary and land issues also drove a wedge into the initial friendly Baster-German relations. The Basters were greatly upset, because they regarded this order as being in direct contrast to the promise that they would not be used against the South African forces. The Baster guards raised their objections to the Baster Council, who in tum prote~ted to the German government, without any success. 22
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REINSTATEMENT OF THE BASTER CORPS
The Basters assured the South African prisoners-of-war that they were under duress to act as guards and at the first and best opportunity they would lay down their arms. at Omaruru. Botha undertook to disarm those armed non-whites in his service and that he would in future only use armed whites. He requested Franke to give the same assurance as soon as possible. 29 Franke assured
Botha that both the Cameroon and Baster companies were used solely for police service among the local non-whites. He unequivocally excused himself from using non-whites to fight against whites, and implied that in this connection Botha ought to be in the dock.
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CAPTAIN CORNELIUS VAN WYK MEETS GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA
While the mutual accusations between Franke and Botha regarding the use of non-whites were taking place, the increasing involvement of the Baster soldiers in the German war effort caused great concern within the Baster community. The Baster Council therefore decided that Captain Cornelius van Wyk should as soon as possible explain their position to the South African military authorities.
In February or March 1915 Van
Wyk obtained permission to visit the game reserve in the KuisebSwakopmund region, under the pretext that he wanted to look for bushtee and salt. Actually he travelled through the barren Namib rand region to establish contact with the South Africans.
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He was accompanied by Samuel Beukes and Dirk van Wyk. He was given a hearing by General Botha on I April.33
Unfortunately the conversation was not put in writing and consequently there are many obscurities regarding it. General Botha did, however, send a cable to General Smuts that he had had talks with Van . Wyk and that the Baster leader was "well disposed" towards the Government. 34 Cornelius van Wyk's motivation to Botha that the Basters did not want to fight on the side of the Germans because they were British subjects by birth,37 has no justification. The Basters realised that if they did not unequivocally explain their efforts to the South Africans to remain neutral, they could possibly lose their territory and self-government. 38
PLANNED TRANSFER OF THE RASTER CORPS TO THE NORTH
As a result of the military successes of the South African forces, it became urgently necessary to transfer the prisoners-of-war and the Baster Corps to the north of South West Africa. 39 Von Gaertringen consequently informed the Baster Council on 13 April 1915 of the planned transfer to Otjiwarongo. The Baster Council refused to comply with this request. They were afraid that, if the Baster Corps were moved to the north, the South Africans would no longer recognise their neutrality. Gertze, however, in his evidence kept back the fact that the councillors present had asked for a postponement to influence their compatriots more strongly against the Germans. 44 His version of the German conduct indicates that he had experienced it as haughty and unyielding.
RASTER SOLDIERS DESERT AT UITDRAAI
While the negotiations regarding the transfer were held at high level, the Baster guards at Uitdraai notified the Baster Council on 17 April of their displeasure by threatening to desert. reached them at about midnight. The Council urgently requested them to be patient, as they were still busy with negotiations. The Baster Council, was however, unaware that the train which would transport both the At Sandputs, about 12 kilometres west of Rehoboth, eight Germans and nine Baster soldiers were under the command of Dr. Bauer, a veterinarian. The Baster soldiers were disarmed at about three o'clock on the morning of 18 April, whereupon the Germans went to the house of another Baster soldier, a certain Coetzee, to disarm him also. Shots that were fired at the fleeing Coetzee upset five of the prisoners to such an extent that they attempted to escape. Petrus Beukes was killed in the ensuing shooting. News of the incident spread like a wildfire throughout the whole Rehoboth Gebiet. Women and children fled in the direction of Sam Kubis.
52
These attempts at disarmament and the death of the unarmed Petrus Beukes brought the tension to a breaking point. In an attempt to defuse the tense situation, further Baster-German negotiations were started. The Baster leaders Matthews Gertze, Klaas Draghoender, a certain Klaasen, Carolus Swart and Willem Koopman, left for Windhoek on 18 April to consult the Governor. Governor Seitz saw them at nine o'clock on 19 April. Apart from Seitz and the Baster leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Bethe, Franke, Von Gaertringen and the missionary, Adolf Blecher of Rehoboth, were also present. The latter acted as interpreter. Seitz blamed the state of affairs on the laxity of the Baster Council, whereupon they in defence argued that they had kept Von Gaertringen informed from the outset. Seitz pointed out to the Basters that Germany was in a favourable position and that the South Africans would soon have to leave German South West Africa. The Basters would then have to account for their foolish behaviour. Seitz ordered the Basters to hand over all the government rifles and sent Bethe as delegate to proceed with the negotiations in Rehoboth. Albert Mouton responded to this request. Bethe then gave orders that issued government weapons were to be handed over to him, but emphasised that the Basters could keep their own weapons. 54 Only eighteen old and useless weapons were handed in up to and including 21 April. Bethe returned to Windhoek that day to report to the Governor. On his return to Rehoboth on 22 April, he attempted to resume negotiations. However, that same day, Bethe finally abandoned the negotiations, which he described as viewless. 55 It was not merely the refusal to hand in government weapons that had made Bethe abandon further negotiations. The fact that German citizens had been murdered by Basters, confronted the German government with a new situation.
RASTERS MURDER GERMAN CITIZENS
While the preceding desertion and joining of Baster forces were taking place, the Basters in tum tried to disarm the Germans in the Adam Heine, a German farmer.
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On their way to Ababis they murdered the German farmer Richard Putzier at Zais on 20 April. 58 The murderers arrived at Abibis on the morning of 21 April at six o'clock and also murdered Heine. According to the testimony of Heine's wife Anna, four armed Basters had meanwhile also arrived. They told her that the murders of Putzier, Rogge and Heine had taken place at the order of Captain Van
Wyk and that they were on their way to Noab to kill Plugge, a farmer, also. The Basters stole all the livestock and ordered her to go to Garies.
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In the following days Sergeant Otto Schubert and Max Hefner of Swartfontein, Georg Eberhardt of Weissenfels, Hermann Hormann of Derm-Wes and Karl Bauer and his family of Blumfelde were also murdered. 6o These senseless murders forced the German authorities to take practical steps to protect their subjects against the Baster violence. The Germans burnt all the wagons and shot all the livestock. The Basters who were able to escape, arrived at Sam Kubis a few days later. The Basters defended themselves bravely, but their ammunition was insufficient. To the great relief of the Basters, the Germans ceased their attack at sunset. The next morning a German patrol under Second Lieutenant L. Stark arrived with the news that the military post at Nauchas had to be evacuated because of the South African advance. Shortly afterwards Captain Count von Saurma-Jeltsch also received the order to withdraw to Rehoboth. The German side only lost three noncommissioned officers and two soldiers, while nine men were wounded. 80 The Basters suffered great losses: in one of the captured trenches the Germans found seventeen Basters who had died in battle.
GERMAN DECLARAnON OF WAR AND SUBSEQUENT BATTLES
That same day Cornelius van Wyk appealed to General Botha to send reinforcements to Rehoboth. Botha, was however, determined that
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For the Basters at Sam Kubis the arrival of the South African forces under the command of Brigadier-general MacKenzie, in the Rehoboth Gebiet, was very timely, because it forced the Germans to withdraw, preventing the 'Basters from being wiped out totallyat Sam Kubis.
82 The
Basters interpreted the sudden withdrawal of the Germans, just as they were about to deliver the final blow, as a direct intervention by God. Sam Kubis Day is still celebrated annually with great enthusiasm and was proclaimed a public holiday by the Baster Council.
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During these meetings the so-called Covenant of Sam Kubis, 84 which strongly resembles the Covenant of Blood River, was made by the celebrators.
After the battle of Sam Kubis the Basters cautiously started to return to Rehoboth. Subsequently Dirk van Wyk, one of the Baster leaders, ordered various people, including some Namas, to murder all Germans they found. A direct result of this was the murders of the farmers Eduard Wenzel at Achaubmund and Karl Herrmann at Rothenstein.
civilians and had to serve as a buffer against the Basters. With the arrival of the South Africans from the south, these posts were also vacated on 23 
